Should the Atomic Bomb have been dropped on Japan?

I have put a link at the end of this. This is where the saying of "read it and weep" must have come from.

Where would be without hindsight. What many modern day "pacifists" and sympathises don't key into their logic is that the Japanese had no intention of surrendering without honour. This was not considered and could never have been allowed.

Hiroshima & Nagasaki was a small price the Japanese paid for their atrocities and dreams of Asian domination.

Aerial bombardment of the home island would have "raised" most Japanese cities and killed millions of civilians. Soldiers on both sides would have died in their 100's of thousands.

The dropping of the bombs actually had mercy on those who did not have mercy on others.

The anti-bomb enthusiasts speak of the post war injuries and ongoing medical conditions of those who survived in the two cities yet what is conveniently omitted is the scars they left on the soldiers they interned and treated inhumanely to the point of eradication.

What of the civilians they slaughtered, (in Timor alone, they executed some 60-70,000 or 13% of their total population).

What of the families of the POW's who would never be the same again.

What of their ongoing medical conditions?

While 95% of all Japanese prisoners were repatriated to Japan only 51% of all allied prisoners of the Japanese survived the war.

http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat1.htm

 

Its a very difficult situation. In Australia you were closer to Japan in the war and therefore suffered more than we did in Europe. Should the bomb have been dropped? With hindsight and knowing the ongoing effects of the radiation, then i want to say no. But knowing what would have been the alternative with a powerful and widespread bombing campaign, then yes it had to be dropped.
I am not sure the second bomb should have been dropped though.

 

Should the bomb have been dropped ?

Had this same question been posed in 1945, after the end of the War in Europe but before the end of the war in the Far East, then I will stake whatever little reputation I have on what the answer would have been.

100% of whoever was polled would have answered "Drop the bomb...immediately !"

I, like so many others had experienced war at first hand.

My family, like so many others, had suffered the grievous loss of one of their sons.

We knew what a continued war with Japan would entail.

The bomb, at the time, was a complete and over-welcome Godsend.

We never had the luxury of hindsight...we were living the day itself.

And that is how I see it.

Ron

 

Kitty

You are quite correct in saying "given hindsight" but, as in all these contentious matters, at the time in question we were dealing with the matter in hand.

Consider this.

We had come through six years of bloody strife and desperately wanted the war to finish.

We knew the Japanase would not surrender, their very Military Code precluded this, and we knew that many more of our forces would be killed.

We heard for the first time of this wonder weapon that seemed to be the answer to our prayers.

Did we welcome it?, you bet we did !

Ron

 

Kitty

Unfortunately, when one is in the process of literally fighting a war for survival one does not have the gift of hindsight.

Consider then the situation with which we were faced in May 1945.

After six terrible years of deprivation and much loss of life the war in Europe had come to an end but we were still faced with the major problem of dealing with Japan.

Many families, including my own, had lost kith and kin.

Along came the Bomb with its promises of speeding the conclusion of the war and coping with a people who would never have considered surrender as it went against their very code of honour.

Was I personally glad that the bomb was dropped ?

You're damn right I was !

Do I think that everyone else thought as I did?

The same answer, in spades !

Ron

 

The question of surrender is an interesting one. It wasn't clear cut, and it certianly wasn't the case that all Japanese were unwilling to surrender, and instead dight to the glorious end.

The clearest indications that the Japanese were split were the attempts by the "peace party" of the Imperial Cabinet to get Stalin to assist in negotiating with the Allies. Two issues that were the basis for failure of these attempts from the start were (a) Stalin had no desire to help negotiate a peace as he was preparing to cancel the Russo-Japanese Non-Aggression Treaty, and enter the war himself, and (b) just like with Germany, the idea Allies had forced their hand by demanding an Unconditional surrender.

The Americans knew that the Japanese had been making contact with the Russians through the Ultra intercepts well before the A-bombs. However, by that stage they knew that they had the upper hand, and were willing to force Japans.

Another issue is whether the bomb was really about forcing a Japanese surrender and saving lives (considering those same Americans could have been saved by opening negotiations with which the Allies could possibly have achieved a lot, instead of an invasion of the Japanese mainland), or was it an early signal to the USSR? Truman was much less an idealist than Roosevelt, and less susceptible to Stalins "charm". He was probably the first real-politik politician of the Cold War in the West (as was Churchill but he had lost power by then).

 

The search for a negotiated peace: Japanese diplomats attempt to surrender Japan prior to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

http://www.google.co.uk/search?hl=e...japanese surrender attempts&btnG=Search&meta=

 

From The Truman Archive - documents related to the decision to drop the Atomic Bomb:

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/index.php

 

Even before the Bomb was used some mebers of the Manhatten Project had serious reservations about using it:

http://www.dannen.com/decision/45-07-17.html

and the original scan:
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistl...entid=79&studycollectionid=abomb&pagenumber=1

 

Who Disagreed With The Atomic Bombing?

DWIGHT EISENHOWER

"...in [July] 1945... Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. ...the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent.

"During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude..."

- Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, pg. 380

In a Newsweek interview, Eisenhower again recalled the meeting with Stimson:

"...the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing."

- Ike on Ike, Newsweek, 11/11/63
______________________

And a number of other military & political leaders who disagreed with the use of the Bombs:

ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY (Chief of Staff to Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman)
GENERAL DOUGLAS MacARTHUR
JOSEPH GREW (Under Sec. of State)
JOHN McCLOY (Assistant Sec. of War)
RALPH BARD (Under Sec. of the Navy)
LEWIS STRAUSS (Special Assistant to the Sec. of the Navy)
PAUL NITZE (Vice Chairman, U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey)

You can read statements made by them at: http://www.doug-long.com/quotes.htm

 

We will never know if in fact they would have surrendered, or if they were beaten. The bombs ended the war and hostilities ceased.

Some of those above would have preferred to use conventional means like troops and the creation of fire storms to bring them to the peace table.

All of the above would have had no choice but to sanction an invasion of Japan and therefore had the decision taken out of their hands.

 

With hindsight I do believe that the Emporer was searching for a way for peace. But it would have taken time. It was a very tricky situation.

 

"With hindsight I do believe that the Emperor was searching for a way for peace. But it would have taken time. It was a very tricky situation." ~ Kitty

Sorry, but I absolutely disagree...The sons and daughters of Nippon were actively working to literally take over the world, along with the Axis Powers under a unified formal alliance developed way before the start of of ANY hostilies...The Japanese saw themselves as a 'pure' culture and openly despised the descendent's of mass migrations from Europe (from France, Britain, Spain...etc...) as mongrels, both unworthy and unfit to simply live, except in servitude the living God, the Emperor of Japan...

With the oil sanctions emplaced from the U.S. because of the US Gunboat Panay sinking and the invasion of Manchuria for it's resources, TOTAL war was inevitable...a total war to the knife and MASS killings started on a scale BY Japan, Germany and Italy NEVER before seen, way outdoing the First World War...The Formal Axis Alliance was for Germany to push through Europe to India and for Japan to push through China and Burma to link up in India...thus cutting off ALL Allied military missions and lines of communication and resources, to conquer and hold the ENTIRE world....and they damn near did it too...

The utter contempt the Japanese held for those military and civilian directly lead to the Rape of Nanking, the LARGEST mass surrender of troops by both the British and American Armies EVER, along with the relish with total barbarism and glee the Japanese slaughtered MILLIONS before they were pushed back on the defensive is now in the History Books...Thank God...fact is the fire bombings of Japan killed WAY more the Atomic Bomb ever did...and there is evidence that Japan was well on it's way the Atomic Bomb, along with Germany (Germany was just SIX months away from having this when it surrendered)...and there is a documented account of Japan sending a "I"-class sub with a plane carrying a radiological bomb to be dropped on California...

The huge increase of casualties that the Allies incurred caused the dread and open fear of the planned invasion of Japan...I don't think you realize just how close we all came to LOSSING the war IN IT"S FINAL STAGES...

The summary conclusions of the 1945 Intelligence Report on the proposed invasion of Japan (Operation Downfall) was as follows:

1. Japan would not surrender unconditionally without a demonstration of total destruction.

2. In an invasion of the Japanese home islands, the people would fight to the death to protect their nation.

3. An invasion of the Japanese home islands would cost approximately 1 million American casualties and perhaps 10 million Japanese. (many historians and Intel Analysts think and suggest THE ENTIRE Japanese culture would die because Hirohito at first would NEVER surrender and the invasions would still be necessary despite the 2 Atomic detonations!!!)

Yes...it was necessary and needed....

 

Actually that was just one of the alternatives considered. There were numerous options for the final defeat of Japan, with the various theatre and branch commanders each pushing for their own preferred method.

Initially, three options that were considered:

1. The encirclement of the Japanese Home Islands (including lodgements on the Asian mainland), which would be followed by an invasion, as suggested by the Navy.
2. The encirclement of the Japanese Home Islands (including lodgements on the Asian mainland), followed by bombardment and blockade without an invasion.
3. A direct assault on Kyushu that would provide additional air and naval bases for the strike on Honshu

MacArthur was all for the final option.

Apart from the attempts of some parties within the Japanese government to seek surrender terms, which are well documented, the very issue of possible US casualties, and how they effected the final decision to drop the bombs, is still being debated:

http://home.kc.rr.com/casualties/
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_downfall3.html

http://www.milnet.com/cia/japan-end/csi9810001.html

The original documents under debate:
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-...on-planning-and-the-a-bomb-decision/final.pdf

The stated 1 million casualties was accepted, even back then, as way over-estimated figure, and the likeliest highest figure was a possible 250, 000 killed and injured US personnel.

However, the biggest concerns for Trumen were not the casualties but (a) the length of the campaign, (b) the political effect of attempting any possible negotiated peace with Japan, in the eyes of the US public, especially as this had not been allowed to happen for germany and for the US public the Japanese had always been the greater enemy, and (c) the effect of the Soviet entry into the war and how much territory they will have occupied during the period of the mainland campaign.

Considering the effects of the firebombings of the Japanese cities before the A-bombs, there was never any ethical concerns about the mass deaths of the Japanese people or considerations of the destruction of the Japanese culture.

As the post-war Occupation shows, the considerations about the Japanese culture wasn't a high priority anyway. The political and social restructuring that occurred during that post-war period was sociologically huge anyway.

 

IV. The Japanese Search for Soviet Mediation

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/29.pdf

.

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/30.pdf

And there are other documents with commentaries on the aforementioned site.

 

A good summation Kyt which shows the conundrum which a new president found himself.

The Japanese had to pay the price for all of these unknown statistics not the allies. Russia would definitely have attempted another land grab as a reward for their part in the Japanese capitulation, which after their two faced approach in the Molotov pact, could not be condoned.

From figures that I have seen previously, the Japanese still had 5,000-12,000 aircraft available for fighter and Kamakazi attacks, 2.5 million troops and over [FONT=Times New Roman,Times]28,000,000 Japanese who had become a part of the National Volunteer Combat Force[/FONT], civilians who were ready to die for the Emperor. They had also crafted knives for the civilians out of ceramic due to the shortage of steel.

I found the link which explains quite a lot about the proposed invasion. It is quite in depth but very eye opening.

http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/8141/downfall.html

 

Good site Spidge. Just had a quick look at the bibliography and I too would recommend two of the books mentioned:

Feather is a great read - each chapter involves a completely new character, who appears and disappears as the invasion and campaign rolls over them.

 

You all realize the US Army in Europe, when notified of redeployement to the Pacific, came VERY, VERY close to open mutiny, right? That was another reason for the Bomb to be dropped....

 

What hasn't been mentioned is the direct affect on the British & Commonwealth forces in SEAC. For the US, Olympic was still being planned, and the month or so before the surrender was a period of realitive respite after Okinawa.

However, what the dropping of the Bombs did was stop one invasion that about to start on the 1st September. The preparations of this were nearly complete and the shedule had been set.

Operation Zipper - the Invasion of Malaya

Operation Zipper was the plan for the capture of Port Swettenham on the north-west coast of Malaya leading to a southward advance on Singapore. The plan was devised by Admiral Lord Mountbatten’s South-East Asia Command after receiving instructions on 3 February 1945 to complete the liberation of Burma as rapidly as possible and then liberating Malaya.

In this sweep “Zipper” concentrated on capturing a beachhead in the Port Swettenham/Port Dickson area of south-west Malaya. The opposition was found by Field marshal Count Hisaichi Terauchi’s Southern region command, i.e. the 29th Japanese Army in Malaya under the command of General K. Doihara’s 7th Area Army. “Zipper” faced two Japanese divisions and an Independent Mixed Brigade, supported by a tank battalion, in the Kra isthmus region.

The Allied Landing Force for “Zipper” was Lt.General O.L.Robert’s XXXIV Indian Corps (5th, 23rd, 25th and 26th Indian Divisions, 3rd Commando Brigade and one Parachute Brigade of the British 6th Airborne Div.), and though “Zipper” itself was to use just two divisions and one brigade, the corps’ additional forces were to be landed as soon as possible for the advance south towards Singapore.

D-day for Zipper was pushed to 9 September and would have landings near Morib with the 25th Indian Division and the 37th bde of the 23rd Indian Division. By D+6 they expected to have airfields near Port Swettenham and Port Dickson.

By D+8, 3 divisions (23rd, 25th, and the 5th) as well as 2 infantry brigades and the 50th Indian Tank Brigade were to be there with the XXXIV Corps HQ.

By D+53 the advance to Singapore was to be well underway.

To support the landings more than 500 aircraft of strategic, tactical and general reconnaissance units of the RAF were assembled at airfields in Burma, Ceylon and the Cocos Islands. At the same time the supply of arms and equipment to the underground organisation in Malaya was intensified and photographic aircraft worked hard to provide advanced information for all three services. One of their tasks was to secure detailed pictures of the proposed landing areas, and most of this was done by a detachment of four Mosquitos from the Cocos Islands under the control of Wing Commander Newman of No. 684 Squadron.

Instead, with the surrender Zipper became the occupation-force for Operation Tiderace - the liberation of the region from the surrendered Japanese.

 

There's about 20-25 essays and articles on this link. All discussing whether the bomb should have been dropped. And it covers both those who are pro and con. Some excellent arguements, and well looking through:

http://hnn.us/articles/10168.html