I love to read about the man. His romantic interpretation of combat. His callas attitude towards cowardice. His temper. His style. But, none the less was he perfect. I am in logistics myself. I have been reading on Operation Torch as we all know the fist time the Americans went on the offensive. Fortunately for the American/Anglo forces it was against the Vichy rather than German defenders. I find it interesting that a man (Patton) of such knowledge in warfare can over look the simple matter of logistics. Patton had little regard for the Navy, as he put it "Its so impersonal", regarding combat at sea verse on land. Had Patton not had the misinterpretation of Naval Support being next to nil in combat, perhaps he would have listened to both British and American Naval officers with a more keen ear. Such as the Americans were out of medical supplies, communication equipment, food, water during the first few days of Operation Torch. Had the supply ships been loaded properly, the priority freight would have been off loaded first. Rather it was the opposite. Plasma was on convoy #2 with the second waive of forces. Radios packed at the bottom of supply ships, inaccessible upon landing to say the least. I was rather surprised in Patton's lack of foresight in loading and offloading of his men and material. Does anyone have anything to add to this deficiency in Patton's Generalship ? thanks, Krieger
I think the logistical maneuvering problems were the nightmare of the newly formed SOS-ETOUSAs', who were responsible for the job during Op Torch.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/48273194/Logistical-Support-of-the-Armies-Vol-1 http://www.scribd.com/doc/48273938/Logistical-Support-of-the-Armies-Vol-2 http://www.scribd.com/doc/48280751/Quartermaster-Corps-Operations-in-the-War-Against-Germany
As we know,Op Torch started by the Nov'42 and the Logistical Organisations like the ASF (The Army Service Force) been formed by 15 weeks earlier, and as far as my knowledge goes ... SOS (Services of Supply), under Brig Gen Lee, been formed by the War Dept, was only 8 weeks. Probably Bolero did its best as I think, but due to the lack of time for preparation, lack of professionalism, manpower (to man the dock), official-clerks as well as office management for proper handling of the logistics (during embarkation-disembarkation either at Casablanca, Orem or at Algiers) etc. made the total thing more critical. Hence SOS-ETUSA was just an infant to carry out the Enormous Job ... where problems were manifold. Another important thing I want to mention that the role of AFHQ (an autonomous work frame), who was the chief logistic-planner for Op Torch, been hardly coordinated the supply process to the theatre but due maintaining wartime secrecy, WD often ignored them. Logistics that been arrived at the port, had been moved in such a manner to avoid congestion, oftenly without proper record keepings! There was a good confusion between the materials that flowed in and flowed out. There was no proper quarters, yards and skilled hands to disburse the logistics at their destination. Turmoil faced when Gen Somervell received a telegram from London (probably by early Sep) stating that 260,000 tons (ship) of service replacement logistics had to be shifted by mid Oct! Anyhow Sommervell managed to embark some 133,000 tons(ship) only for the assult convoys. Untill or unless the assist of Gen Lee as his men worked for round the clock, the problems been solved a lot. I think it was not before Casablanca Conference logistical support got any priority. Op Bolero once became more critical due to Op Sledgehammer, the contingency plan for an cross-channel attack. SOS-ETOUSA was not enough skilled to cope up.
AFHQ: http://www.scribd.com/doc/33375899/WWII-Allied-Forces-HQ-History http://www.scribd.com/doc/40476158/Allied-Forces-HQ-History-1944
Well, ain't have a good idea but as I know the concept of " combat loading" developed during WW2, when the amphibious campaigns started.
Transport Quartermaster (Combat Loading): http://www.scribd.com/doc/27382917/Transport-Quartermaster-Manual-november-1944
Transport Quartermaster: http://www.criticalpast.com/video/6...-Pfficer_profile-storage-plan_loading-summary http://www.criticalpast.com/video/6...rgo-getting-aboard_amphibious-vehicles-loaded
Operation Torch. Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/38569.pdf
