The Battle of Midway, the Turning Point

Furious with anger, the U.S. Navy was at its peak after Pearl Harbor. The Japanese whom had failed to sink a single carrier during the attack of Pearl Harbor had pin pointed the locations of the U.S. carriers to Midway. The Japanese awaited an ambush, planning on crushing the U.S. Navy in one fell swoop. Due to reconaissance in the area, the U.S. had found the Japanese fleet. After 3 days of grueling battle, the U.S.S. Yorktown had been sunk. On the contrary three Japanese carriers were sunk. With Japan's Navy crushed, the U.S. did not lose another battle.

 

Umm, it helped just a bit that the USN was reading the IJN's mail . . . always makes knowing where to look and positioning one's forces a little easier.

Prior to the morning of 4 June 1942, the Japanese had not pin-pointed the location of any US fleet units. The US reconnaissance from Midway located the Japanese invasion force on 3 June and the Japanese carriers on the morning of the 4th, long before the Japanese even suspected there were US fleet units in the area. No, the Japanese did not ambush the Americans, the Americans, as was their intent all along, ambushed the Japanese.

Also, there were four Japanese carriers sunk at Midway, not three.

And, regretfully, the USN came out on the short end of the stick in on more than one subsequent engagement . . . Savo Island quickly comes to mind. Point is that the IJN was far from "crushed" at Midway. Wounded, maybe even seriously wounded, yes, but not crushed.

 

Japan still had two carriers left after Midway. The breaking of Japanese code wasn't the only problem the Japanese had. From what I have read, the Japanese commander had placed only 1 battleship to protect the 4 carriers if I am not mistaken. While he had 4 other battleships in the rear. These battleships also carried reconnaissance planes needed for scouting. This mistake caused the Japanese had insufficient reconnaissance planes at the frontline to cover all of the directions.

If they placed more battleships with the carriers, they would have had more scout planes, they could have located American carriers earlier. That could also mean more AA firepower for their carrier formation, it might have made a difference.

 

The Japanese had more than two carriers left after Midway, more like about six, let’s see, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Zuiho, Ryujo, Junyo, and Hosho, and that leaves out Hiyo about to be commissioned by the end of July 1942. And the USN - Saratoga, Enterprise, Hornet, and, since I included Hosho in the IJN count, Long Island; and already scheduled to go to the Pacific, Wasp. That left Ranger in the Atlantic, soon to be joined by the four Sangamon class CVEs.

I wouldn’t get too fixated on the presence of, or absence, Japanese battleships. And, truth of the matter, there were two “battleships” present with the Kido Butai, Kirishima, with three spotting planes, and Haruna, also with three. As far as escorts are concerned I would nor forget not just the extra battleship, but also two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and about a dozen destroyers.

If you were to read up on the Battle of Midway you would quickly find that the majority of search aircraft put up by the Japanese came, as per their operating doctrine, from cruisers – which tended to carry five scouting planes (though there is reason to believe at Midway they were reduced to four each). In fact, the primary wielders of the scouting planes were the two heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma, specifically configured for this task (you should take a look at their profiles, these ships were designed for this purpose).

Of the seven scouting aircraft sent out by the Japanese that morning – and the entire search mission was just a precaution, they had no idea the USN force was lurking off their east-northeast; no one expected any USN fleet response for at least another 48 to 72 hours and, according to the Japanese plan, were supposed to stumble over a submarine scouting line long before reaching Midway; the Japanese expected plenty of warning – four float planes were launched from cruisers (two from each of the aforementioned cruisers), one B5N each from Akagi and Kaga, and one float plane from the battleship Haruna.

A quick look at the search area assignments, by the way, shows the Haruna’s plane headed off in a direction (roughly 31°) and distance (150 NMi) which totally precluded any chance of finding the USN force. The two carrier planes, similarly flew search patterns in the other direction which precluded their finding enemy vessels, one headed south down a 181° bearing and the other slightly to the south-southeast down 158°, though both were tasked with going out as far as 300 NMi. The heavy lifting of the Japanese search was to be performed by the longer legged cruiser float planes, planned to go to the southeast and around to northeast, tracks 123°, 100°, 77° and 54° and out 300 NMi. These tracks, with 23° separation form a slightly larger fan than the would have the standard USN search of 20° separation such as the VB-5 search which located the Hiryu.

Oh, and what happened to the other cruiser and battleship planes? They either stayed aboard their ships as reserve or were used for ASW patrol. One should note, however that there were at least eight cruiser or battleship float planes which were not included in the original search plan (more than were actually sent out) . . . so what would an additional two or three planes from some other battleship buy, except pilots sitting around waiting for orders or boring holes in the sky over their own ships? Obviously, though, additional search planes certainly could have been tasked to either reduce search sectors or expand the search fan, but apparently the IJN planners did not think it necessary. The presence, or absence, of a couple-three of additional battleship float planes does not even fit into the equation.

Further, the presence of additional battleships would probably have little to no impact on the strikes which actually took out the carriers. The mind set, both Japanese and American, was that the greatest danger to a capital warship from aircraft was the torpedo. As the SBDs from Enterprise and Yorktown were gathering overhead from two different directions, the attention of just about everyone a sea level in the Kido Butai was on the TBDs from VT-3 making their run in just as the survivors of VT-6 were making their get away. The evidence is pretty clear that no one saw the SBDs until they had already started on their way down.

A properly executed dive bombing attack was near impossible to stop with AAA fire alone. Further, Japanese AAA capabilities in the 1942 period were, to be charitable, less than effective. Several reasons come to mind, one, no radar; two, little coordination, most mounts were local control; three, compared to later appearance, an insufficient number of effective weapons, fourth, insufficient arcs of fire; fifth short effective range (as opposed to nominal range which is usually wildly optimistic under combat conditions), and so on. The Japanese AAA at Midway with the greatest chance of foiling the dive bombers, the 25 mm intermediate guns had not the range to engage said dive bombers before they actually entered their attack dives. This presented the problem of too many targets to engage, at an angle which was difficult to engage, and about 15 seconds of effective range to do so . . . kind of an impossible problem, something that made dive bombing such an attractive delivery system.

There are studies on the subject of the efficacy of AAA fire generally, and IJN AAA fire specifically, available for perusal if one is so moved and is adept at asking the right question of a search engine. For example, the post war USN Technical Mission to Japan produced three separate studies on IJN AAA capabilities and weapons and a couple of others on IJN fire control – all easy to find if for those who might take the trouble.

Another problem with battleships was simply their inability to keep up, station keeping, with carriers . . . the USN had battleships (Task Force 1) which - had anyone thought it would do any good – could have made for the Midway operating area, but none of them could have kept up with a carrier at war speed. The Japanese had the same problem. A battleship does no good when it falls over the horizon somewhere in the wake of the carriers. In fact, the “battleships” (plural) present in the Kido Butai were technically battle cruisers not battleships (look up their armor as compared to that of a true battleship); a battle cruiser could keep up.

So, more battleships would have had no appreciable impact of the Japanese search, unless one wanted to conduct a 360 degree search instead of the 100 degree (which, of course, included the area where they actually did find the USN forces) search that actually transpired. The Japanese were well aware that searching to their south-southwest around to north was a waste of time so a 360 degree was not necessary.

AAA fire from an additional battleship would similarly not be significantly augmented from in terms of both weapons availability and operation and in station keeping capabilities.

The reason there were Japanese battleships held some 500 miles behind the Kido Butai (and, perhaps significantly, why this rear formation was called the Main Force) was that so they could be brought up once the USN made an appearance (sometime after 7 June or so) so as to fall on the USN flank as they were distracted by an engagement with the Kido Butai. Unfortunately no USN representative had attended the Japanese planning war games and, as such the USN was unaware of the role they were supposed to play . . . unwitting victims.

 

A few good advantages/confidence gained by USN,soonest the battle of Midway over,Victory in this battle handed the strategic initiative of IJN in the Pacific to the US,an initiative which they retained till the end of the War 2.

Imperial J Navy,then superior to US,crashed by the hand of strategy,their further conquests or advancement stopped by the USN. Admiral Nimitz[intercepted Japs' naval-code and made their fleet ready] alongwith others proved that Hirohito's dream could be crushed, if some extra initiatives had to be taken.The Japanese also intercepted, but cannot decode, a report by USS Cuttlefish [SS-171] returning from patrol near Saipan. Around midnight, the IJN's 6th [Submarine] Fleet at Kwajalein also reports monitoring messages exchanged by two American task groups located 170 miles NNE of Midway, moving westwards.Crucial moments here came for the IJN as Admiral Yamamoto[onboard Yamato] suggested to relay to Flagship[1st Air-fleet]Akagi, senior stff-off Capt Kuroshima intended not to break radio-silence for it. ..... . and suppressed it.

Another important thing was the loss of hundreds of most experienced Japanese sailors as well as air crews[some three thousand].This costs much to IJN.For USN,they had a cost of [carier]USS Yorktown/[destr]USS Hammann and [cruisr]Mikuma of the IJN along with others as mentioned in previous thread.

After Midway,USN initiated for further offensive movement,rather than a hectic wait to defend.

 

This could be an interesting discussion topic; however, the paragraph opening the discussion is lacking facts. The BOM is one of the US Navy's finest moments, but they were not at their peak. The IJN didn't sink any carriers at Pearl on Dec. 7 because the carriers were at sea. They did sink the Lexington CV-2 at Coral Sea and they almost sunk the Yorktown, CV-5, at the same battle. It was Nimitz's plan to ambush the IJN at Midway not the other way around. Nimitz felt that if he could strike a blow against the IJN that it would slow them down or stall their campaign long enough for the war effort in the US to catch up. Using the information obtained by the crypto team in Hawaii Nimitz felt that he had the advantage. He stuck his neck out a long way. He did this despite a strong warning from Admiral King back in DC that he should not deploy his carriers. It was still short notice and they made preparations and reinforced Midway the best they could. The badly damaged Yorktown arrived in Pearl just as the Enterprise, CV-6, and Hornet, CV-8. were leaving for Point Luck. 72 hours later the Yorktown task force departed Pearl to rendezvous with Enterprise and Hornet at Point Luck. She still had engineers on board making repairs and a brand new air squadron. In addition, her plane mechanics and deck crews were scrambling to assemble folding wing F4F4 Wildcat fighters that had arrived in Pearl from the states in crates. Fighters that she would need for protection when the Japanese attacked. It was the turning point, but no one knew it then. Admiral Yamamoto's Midway campaign was very complicated. Its success, in part, depended on two important things; 1. the element of surprise. 2. the US Navy carriers being in Pearl. Neither were true. One of many things that interests me about this battle is the presence of the entire Yorktown class of carriers; USS Yorktown, USS Enterprise and USS Hornet. I think I've said enough

 

Yard workers aboard Yorktown as she sailed out of Pearl to her final action is urban legend. Only people aboard were the ships company and the air group.

New to the Yorktown Air Group (remember, they were named in those days, not numbered) were VB-3 and VT-3, nominally the SBD bombing and TBD torpedo squadrons from Saratoga. Also aboard with the air group, but not entirely new, was VF-3; but one should remember that VF-3, at the end of May 1942, was somewhat short handed, some 28 planes and only 12 pilots and no, none, zero, assigned enlisted crewmen. (Another thing to remember, in those days all the maintenance, ordnance, administration, what have you, enlisted personnel associated with a squadron were assigned to that squadron. It was the advent of the Essex class carriers when all those types were assigned to ships company not to squadrons.) Anyway, there was LCDR "Jimmy" Thach over at Kaneohe NAS with airplanes (which BTW were already assembled, there was no assembling on the ship), but less than half the pilots he needed, and no enlisted types assigned (all his maintenance and ordnance work was performed by folks assigned to the NAS).

Well, over at MCAS Ewa was the fighting squadron that had been aboard Yorktown since, oh, say, about June 1941, this being VF-42 (nominally a USS Ranger squadron). All of the VF-42 enlisted men were still aboard Yorktown. Thach was senior to the VF-42 skipper, Charlie Fenton, and Thach's exec, Don Lovelace, was senior to Fenton's exec, Vince McCormack, so none of the VF-42 leadership could go over to VF-3 - the Navy is/was funny about things like that, not liking to move people backwards. The next senior VF-42 officer was a LT who was about to be sent home for surgery, which left the senior LTJG, one Bill Leonard, who was told to gather up the rest of the pilots, and report to Thach at Kaneohe; which he did. So, VF-3, nominally a Saratoga fighting squadron, was populated by 16 VF-42 (a Ranger squadron) pilots, operating off Yorktown, with the VF-42 contingent outnumbering the VF-3 personnel. Not to mention that Thach now had the experienced VF-42 enlisted types working for him, although, unlike the pilots, they were never ordered to VF-3 and remained assigned to VF-42.

So, VF-3, with its VF-42 contingent, saddles up their nice new F4F-4s and heads out to the ship, now headed for her final destiny. In the midst of landing operations, Don Lovelace leads his division aboard. As one might expect his landing goes as one might expect from an old hand and, clearing the wire, he taxis his plane forward of the barrier. His wingman, an VF-3 ensign not long out of the training pipeline, however, misses all the arrestor wires, hits hard on his front gear, bounces over the barrier and land squarely on Lovelace's plane. Lovelace, struck by the propeller was dead in minutes.

Now, Thach had no exec, and had lost a dear friend of long standing in what was, essentially, a stupid accident. The exec duties passed to that senior VF-42 LTJG, Bill Leonard.

There's more that can be said, but I fear I shall be boring one and all with the details of the VF-3/VF-3 assimilation.

R

 

Thus lies the problem with this post . . Saying this was the "turning point" 70+ years after the actual battle does not do any of the men that participated the honor that they deserve. There was once an entire website and discussion devoted to the BOM. It is now archived.
The one thing I would discuss with R Leonard is that I have printed information from Hummel, Lundstrom, or other authors that the Yorktown did have civilian engineers aboard making repairs when she departed Pearl . . BTW.. That's what's cool about these discussions is finding someone who has more facts that you (I) do.
I totally agree "we" (You and I) would be boring one and all with details . . ttyl

 

And your original statement was:

Well, grabbing a handful of tomes off the shelf that deal specifically with subject of USS Yorktown (CV-5), there is absolutely no mention of your yard workers remaining aboard during the Midway deployment in Robert Cressman’s That Gallant Ship – USS Yorktown CV-5 (1985), Jeff Nesmith’s No Higher Honor (1999) or even reaching way back to Joe Harrington and Pat Frank’s 1967 Rendezvous at Midway. Note that all of these books are centered on the USS Yorktown.

I am not sure which version of which John Lundstrom work you are reading, but in my much read and re-read copies of his The First Team – Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway (1984) and Black Shoe Carrier Admiral (2006) neither makes any reference to Yorktown departing Pearl Harbor with civilian yard workers aboard. You might wish to re-peruse your version(s). When you do, check who wrote the forward for The First Team. The similarity in his last name and mine is not a coincidence.

Running through some of the more mainstream, broader looking Midway works, Cressman, Steve Ewing, et. al., A Glorious Page in our History (1990) whispers not a word, nay, not even a single letter about civilian workers aboard as the ship heads out to sea. Gordon Prange’s Miracle at Midway (1982) likewise makes no mention. VADM William W. "Poco" Smith, commander of the Yorktown's screen makes no mention in his Midway - Turning Point of the Pacific (1966). When we get to Walter Lord’s 1967 “Incredible Victory” we can find what is probable the kernel of truth in the reporting, if not in the actual event. Lord writes of a pipefitting gang (in the USN parlance, specific working parties, civilian or naval are traditionally referred to as “gangs”) working deep in the ship as she is being readied to leave Pier 16, to head out into the channel and, thence, out sea. They were reportedly good naturedly advised “all ashore that’s going ashore.” Scrambling up from their work site, and it sounds as though leaving whatever they were doing unfinished, the ship had apparently already cast off and they were forced to take a launch back to shore. See Lord, “Incredible Victory,” page 39. Hardly what one could characterize as remaining aboard, toiling away, as the ship heads off to Midway and destiny; most certainly not "engineers." One might note, provided no attribution for his snippet. And even farther back, 1960, we find no mention of repair workers remaining aboard the Thaddeus Tuleja'a Climax at Midway.

So, Lord seems to be the only commonly perused author to have some pipefitters leaving the ship as she enters the channel . . . hardly heading off towards Midway with engineers still aboard . . . and no one else speaks to the subject. And if all anyone else might write in less well known works is simple an expansion on Lord's report, then that leads us into circular reporting that is slightly altered with each reporting, with each more incorrect than the previous. Certainly, from the written record and eyewitness accounts there were still civilian yard gangs aboard when Dry dock Number 1 was flooded on the morning of 29 May ’42 and the ship moved over to Pier 16 for final provisioning; and, if Lord’s solitary account can be credited, a small number working right up to as the ship pulled away from Pier 16 on the 30th. To present this as the presence of, and to call up the image, of all these gangs toiling away as the ship heads out to sea . . . this is a gross exaggeration. Repetition will not make it true. Oh, and let us not go down the road of the infallible historian, it is not at all difficult to page through Lord, Prange, indeed, just about anyone, and catch mistakes, mis-statements, or unvetted sea stories. The question is how many are found and how serious the error. Try reading Gerald Astor’s Wings of Gold, OMG, does nobody check facts?

I confess to having no idea who is your referenced “Hummel,” – to me these are overly cherubed little figurines from Germany - but if he/she is claiming the presence of civilian workers aboard as the ship deploys, then that is just an unsubstantiated repeat of the urban legend, at worst, or, at best, an exaggerating third hand repeating of Lord’s tale . . . sure sounds good, but is naught but a sea story.

One might note that those who abandoned Yorktown and were plucked from the water by various escorts were eventually transferred to USS Fulton for transport back to Pearl Harbor. Once all were aboard Fulton, muster was held and a complete roster drawn up listing survivors. I have a copy of that roster - oddly enough, but maybe not at all so odd if you think about it, the VF-42 copy – and there are no, repeat, no, civilians on that list. So, what happened to them?

Captain Elliot Buckmaster makes no reference or statement as to the presence of civilian yard workers aboard Yorktown in his after action report.

Around my house, when one mentioned USS Yorktown it was understood that one meant CV-5. If one wanted to talk about the Essex class carrier with the same name, one said, simply, “CV-10” without invoking the name. I have had, over the years, many, a great many, discussions with numerous actual participants on the US side of the battle, the great preponderance of them from USS Yorktown – both ships company and air group, officer and enlisted, with who I was privileged to be personally acquainted – and I have specifically asked about the presence of civilian workers . . . the answers were uniformly to the negative. I would tend to side with those who were there and not a ‘oh the breathless excitement of it all’ single paragraph in a single, however well received, but, nonetheless, pop-history.

 

Midway - strategical and tactical analysis 1948:

https://archive.org/details/battleofmidwayin00bate


https://archive.org/search.php?query=strategical and tactical analysis

 

The Battle of Midway was definitely a very significant point in the Pacific Theater, for all the reasons stated above. What in your opinion makes it a turning point though? as opposed to just a very significant battle. There were many battles that followed, so to me it's hard to decide what the actual turning point is.