Here are just a few. Read the rest here: http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/misc/myths1.htm [SIZE=-1]Here is a collection of famous myths and falsehoods in aviation history. If you can come up with any others, please let me know. [/SIZE] [SIZE=-1] "RAF Battle of Britain fighter pilots were mostly upper-class former public schoolboys." - In fact, of the 2900 fighter pilots who fought in the Battle of Britain, ("The Few"), only 200 went to public (i.e. private) school. The bulk came from humble or grammar school backgrounds and 20 per cent were of foreign nationality - including Czechs, Poles, Americans and Canadians. [The origins of this myth go back to the early days of the RAF. In the 1920s and 1930s it was widely believed that only public schoolboys provided the right material for military officers and the RAF recruited accordingly. When the Auxiliary Air Force was established in 1924 for reservist pilots, the only people who could afford to join where wealthy young men who didn't need to spend six days every week at work. Thus the Aux AF became a social club for a certain class of people. With the rapid expansion of the RAF in the 1930s, the formation of the Volunteer Reserve introduced a new social class of pilots - the non-commissioned officer, (NCO). The VR strongly attracted young working men who wanted to learn how to fly - for free. With the coming of war, the initial strength of the RAF was built around a core of experienced regular officers, supplemented by the members of the Auxiliary Air Force and large numbers of Volunteer Reserve 'Seargent Pilots'. The popular British wartime propaganda film 'The First of the Few', about the origins of the Spitfire and its role in the Battle of Britain, made with the help of Auxiliary and Regular Air Force pilots, was one of the first vehicles for the public schoolboy heroes myth.] [/SIZE] [SIZE=-1] "The Battle of Britain was virtually unwinable for the Luftwaffe." - Recently is has become fashionable for revisionist historians to say that the RAF couldn't have lost the Battle of Britain, or that the Luftwaffe had almost no chance of winning. They argue that, overall, the Luftwaffe had fewer fighters than the RAF in the Battle, and therefore the RAF wasn't really outnumbered. Since Operation 'Sealion' (the German invasion of Britain) depended on the defeat of the RAF to succeed, they argue that the invasion threat was never serious. In fact, as RAF pilots were only too aware, the Luftwaffe could easily achieve local air superiority over their targets in southern England, and the RAF shortage was in pilots not aircraft. Had the Luftwaffe used better offensive tactics - as demanded by the aircrews themselves - such as allowing the escort fighters to roam more freely from the bombers, then German losses could have been lower and attacks more effective. Knocking out British RDF (radar) stations and systematically destroying RAF fighter bases would have severely limited RAF Fighter Command's ability to effectively defend Southern and Eastern England. If the sudden change in Luftwaffe tactics to area bombing of cities hadn't been made, (in reprisal for small scale RAF raids on Berlin), the RAF would have been forced to progressively retreat north and west, with an increasingly serious pilot shortage. In this case, peace talks with Germany would be highly likely, and Churchill wouldn't have remained Prime Minister for very long. [/SIZE] [SIZE=-1] "Since the Luftwaffe didn't consider that a distinct 'Battle of Britain' took place, the battle had no effect on the overall course of the war - other than to give the Americans an unsinkable aircraft carrier." - "If Britain had given up the struggle in...1940, at least half of the German [army] divisions in the west, plus the crack Afrika Korps, (10 per cent of German Panzer strength), plus nearly all of the aircraft based in western Europe and the Mediterranean would have been used against Russia [in the summer of 1941]. To these should be added the German airborne forces which would not have been decimated in Crete in May 1941. The result would have been a crushing German victory in 1941 or 1942 and a Nazi dominated Europe..." - Christopher Dorne, BBC History Magazine, July 2000. [/SIZE] [SIZE=-1] "The introduction of the Me 262 was delayed by Hitler's insistence on its use as a bomber." - It was of course technical difficulties with the engines that caused the delay. [/SIZE] [SIZE=-1] "The Polish air force was wiped out in the first two days of World War Two." - The air force had secretly deployed to reserve airfields on 30th August 1939, and continued flying combat operations until the surrender. [/SIZE] [SIZE=-1] "The Fairey Swordfish flew so slowly that naval anti-aircraft guns couldn't track it." - ALL the attacking Swordfishes in the 'Channel Dash' incident were shot down, mostly by AA fire. [/SIZE] [SIZE=-1] "The Japanese nicknamed the Bristol Beaufighter, the 'Whispering Death'." - Invented by some over-imaginative journalist at a bar. In the middle of World War Two, the Japanese weren't likely to answering questions about aircraft nicknames. Similarly, the "Whistling Death" nickname allegedly given to the Chance Vought F4U Corsair by the Japanese is dubious.[/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]"Adolf Galland rated the Spitfire so highly he told Goering 'Give me a squadron of Spitfires'." - Here's a quote from his book The First And The Last: [/SIZE] [SIZE=-1]"The theme of fighter protection was chewed over again and again. Goering clearly represented the point of view of the bombers and demanded close and rigid protection. The bomber, he said, was more important than record bag figures. I tried to point out that the Me109 was superior in the attack and not so suitable for purely defensive purposes as the Spitfire, which, although a little slower, was much more manoeuvrable. He rejected my objection. We received many more harsh words. Finally, as his time ran short, he grew more amiable and asked what were the requirements for our squadrons. Moelders asked for a series of Me109's with more powerful engines. The request was granted. 'And you ?' Goering turned to me. I did not hesitate long. 'I should like an outfit of Spitfires for my group.' After blurting this out, I had rather a shock, for it was not really meant that way. Of course, fundamentally I preferred our Me109 to the Spitfire, but I was unbelievably vexed at the lack of understanding and the stubbornness with which the command gave us orders we could not execute - or only incompletely - as a result of many shortcomings for which we were not to blame. Such brazen-faced impudence made even Goering speechless. He stamped off, growling as he went." [/SIZE]
