Being ex-RN I've always had an interest in the Battle of the Atlantic, and when the actual turning point occurred, to allow the allies to control the sea lanes once more. There were so many factors that came into play around the same time that it's difficult to pin it down to one thing, was it : The advance in long range air cover The breaking of enigma Advances in ASDIC and detecting the U-Boats, The development of the Corvette and it's greater accuracy laying depth charges ? Or was it simply that Germany couldn't build replacement boats quick enough ?
Unlike the Pacific War that had some key turning points (e.g, Coral Sea, Midway, etc.), the Battle of the Atlantic is a bit more difficult to pinpoint the actual turning point. However, you've hit many of the key factors and they all were part of the equation. At the end of the day, though, I think was largely attrition. The Axis could crank out, deploy, and support only so many U-Boots and once the US was full engaged in the war, Liberty ships were rolling at a stunning pace.
My old college professor was able to "interview" Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz after the war, in fact several times. The impression he devived was that the Battle of the Atlantic was lost BEFORE the start of the war. German naval construction was, in 1935, timed for a war starting in 1943, not 1939. Emphasis was on capital ships, most of whom saw little action in the war, rather that U-boats. Germany started WWII with an effective U-boat fleet of about 30 operational boats, not the 100 which Doenitz begged for. (30 operational, 30 in transit, 30 refitting = practical U-boat fleet). Had the Germans started the war 300 U-boats instead of 100 it probably changed the war in Germany's favour. As it was, with only 100 it was a close run race.
I was under the impression that they started with a lot more than that, and produced over 1000 during the war, http://uboat.net/boats/listing.html Which why I was asking the question, where was the turning point that enabled the allies to destroy them faster than they could produce them, when you take into account that raids and bombing of various repair pens, ( St Nazaire) were ineffective in reducing the numbers, and or increasing the turn around times, plus the advent of the milch cow, allowed boats to stay at sea a lot longer.
According to the linked site you provided, under losses per year, the Germans started the war with 57 operational U-boats. That roughly equals the 1/3 + 1/3 estimate I provided (with 1/3 being readied for sea). Even with a scant Fifty-seven boats and operating from German ports these captains and crews worried the British/Allies also to the point of distraction. As to a definitive "turning point", to address your original query, there were several through the war. These were mostly based on technological improvements on both sides. It was "move-countermove", done by brave but doomed men.
Experience and skills acquired during the first two years of war must also be put into the pot. We British always start a war by losing, by 1943 the Royal Navy were "seasoned veterans" I agree I think lots of bits put together turned the tide, I do not think that a single item was a game changer.
The Germans were never remotely close to dominate the Atlantic battlefield. Their navy was puny compare to the British fleet. Throughout the war, the Germans relayed on the U-boats and "raiders". They couldn't hope to fight the British fleet face to face in major engagement with what they had. Thus there was never a turning point on this side of the war.
The turning point was when allied shipping got more experience, and got escorts. They were then able to fight off the u-boats enough that the u-boats weren't very effective anymore, and didn't do enough damage to matter in the overall course of the war. It was just experience that allied shipping was lacking, and they got it later in the war, and used it to get rid of the U-boat problem.
Vashstampe, would you agree with my comment of 25 July, 2014, that the German naval war was lost before the fighting began, due to poor strategic planning? Again, my point is that had the German Navy begun the war with 300 superior U-boats rather than building BB and CA (Battleships and Cruisers), it would have been likely that they would have starved the UK by 1941.
I totally disagree, I think that Germany knew that we relied on the US and Canada for a large amount of our supplies, and the development of the U-Boat was seen as the best way of limiting that supply, they were in the beginning hard to detect, and even harder to deal with. The German surface fleet was largely ignored for the simple reason that high command knew the Allies had superior numbers and would hound the capital ships down, in terms of ships lost, the Germans won !
Yes. Hitler rushed into the war without waiting for the military being actually properly prepared. Germans could never beat the British navy with what they had in the water Now it is about the definition of "turning point"? To me, it is about the fact who will win the war has been changed. Since Germany never had the naval power to win in Atlantic, there was no such thing as turning point to me. It seems, your definition of turning point was who was losing more ships? Even toward the end of the war, Germans were still destroying more allies tanks and aircraft on all fronts than their own losses. So which one was the turning point? lol
Jack Rouse, If the German High Command were cognascent of the strengths and effectiveness of the U-boats vis-a-vis their Capital ships then why did they start the war with only 57 (fifty-seven) U-boats? As I stated before, Grand Admral Karl Doenitz, commander of the U-boat fleet in 1939, told my old professor and he told me, Doenitz wanted 300 U-boats at the start of the war. He was denied. German steel, matertial, men, training and gold went into CAPITAL ships instead. The easiest way to change the outcome of the war is just to give Doenitz his boats at the start of the war.
Vashstampede, the Battle of the Atlantic was never about a "fist" fight between the Royal Navy and the Kreigsmarine, it was about the control of the sea lanes that supplied Britain. U Boats and surface raiders whose aim was to sink merchant ships not warships.
@ aghart, Obviously whoever dominants the sea will dominants the sea lanes. Usually the side with stronger navy will control the sea lanes. The U-boats and surface raiders were just desperate attempt to disrupt the enemy shipping when Germans' naval power was at a disadvantage. If the Germany could, they would have used head on fighting to eliminate the enemy threat as quick as they can, then the sea and all the sea lanes would be theirs. U-boats and raiders wouldn't be necessary at all in such case.
